UCLA Anderson Forecast Announces a Recession Watch: Trump Policies, If Fully Enacted, Promise a Recession
Clement Bohr, Economist, UCLA Anderson Forecast
Recessions are typically the result of a confluence of multiple events, whether disparate or intertwined, that lead to simultaneous contractions in multiple sectors of the economy. Often these involve the financial sector, though that is not necessary. For instance, there were many factors that contributed to the severity of the Great Depression, including a financial crash, an agricultural drought, restrictive monetary policy, and a trade war. More recently, the 1990 recession came about from a contraction in manufacturing, government and residential construction, which were induced by a shock to oil prices, restrictive monetary policy, and a reduction in defense spending following the cold war. A single sector that contracts does not usually suffice in triggering a recession as evidenced by manufacturing in 1995.
As 2025 begins to unfold, there are no signs of an imminent recession. The U.S. added 151,000 jobs in the month of February, and the unemployment rate and unemployment claims remain low at 4.1% and 220,000, respectively. The future also looks bright due to the promises of Artificial Intelligence, smart deregulation, as well as recent public and private investments in infrastructure and technology. However, the stated aim of the Trump Administration is to dramatically transform the U.S. economy in its first 100 days and that begs the question: if fully or nearly fully enacted, could these initiatives cause enough sectors of the economy to contract at the same time and trigger a recession?
The answer appears to be yes, that a downturn could result over the coming year or two, and that we should now be on a Recession Watch. The administration’s purportedly desired policies would impose, each in their own way, a significant contraction on different sectors of the economy. Weaknesses are beginning to emerge in households’ spending patterns. And the financial sector, with elevated asset valuations and newly introduced areas of risk, is primed to amplify any downturn. What’s more, the recession could end up being stagflationary. The main areas of concern are:
The tariff policy and ensuing trade wars will likely lead to a contraction in the manufacturing sector. If fully implemented, the effective tariff rate will rise to similar levels as the Smoot-Hawley tariffs during the Great Depression. These will make it much more costly for American manufacturers to produce, and because of the highly integrated cross-border supply chains, make current operations in some industries uneconomical. The CEO of Ford Motor Company bluntly stated that incoming tariffs would blow a hole in the US car industry. Downstream and upstream sectors, such as retail and agriculture, will likely also contract. During the first Trump administration, parts of the US agricultural industry needed a bailout because of the trade war with China. The size of that trade war looks like pennies relative to what’s currently contemplated.
Under the directive of Elon Musk-led DOGE, the public sector, its contractors, and its grant recipients are undergoing a reduction in their workforce that is intended to reach 10 to 15 percent. Given that the size of the extended government is around 10 million people, it will amount to the largest single layoff event in U.S. history of up to a million people. And this contraction will take place in a sector that usually serves as a macroeconomic stabilizer, buffering against any decline in economic activity in the private sector.
The construction sector, which tends to be a powerful propagator of the business cycle, is particularly vulnerable to mass deportations on the scale of many millions of people. Together with agriculture, this sector relies heavily on immigrant labor and already experiences a labor shortage. One consistent empirical finding across deportation events, going as far back as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and as recently as the Secure Communities program of 2008, is that deportations lead to a loss of jobs for non-immigrants as well. Immigrants occupy distinct occupations from much of the rest of the population, and once deported, they stop spending, paying rent and taxes here.
The exceptional degree of uncertainty surrounding these policies is in and of itself damaging to the economy. The ad-hoc and fitful tariff policy paralyzes firms’ investment and hiring decisions as they prefer to wait until there is more clarity surrounding future economic conditions. The threat of deportations paralyzes economic activity in immigrant communities as both workers and consumers choose to stay home in fear of capture. DOGE’s activities are creating a heightened level of job insecurity for most federal workers. Such income uncertainty, even for those who maintain their jobs, leads to a pullback in spending and a build-up in precautionary savings. As a result, many measures of consumer and business sentiment have turned negative over the last month.
If contractions in manufacturing, government, construction, and their adjacent sectors were to occur at the same time, it would likely spill over to the rest of the economy, broadening the downturn. The extent of this amplification depends on the underlying conditions of the economy, which as it turns out, might be primed to be severe. Why?
The financial sector often serves as a recessionary amplifier and may yet again, as it is currently in an exuberant and possibly irrational state. Even with the current sell-off, equity valuations are at levels that parallel the dot-com bubble. There has been a surge in investment in somewhat speculative assets, like Artificial Intelligence, as well as purely speculative assets, like cryptocurrencies. Corporate bond spreads are near all-time lows, suggesting investors still aren’t fully pricing in risk. House prices are near record levels, while the number of new unsold homes on the market is at levels last seen in 2009 and still climbing. Finally, private credit markets have become an important new player in the financial sector, and as of now, the systemic risks they may pose to the system are not well understood and likely underappreciated.
The administration is also playing with fire when it comes to the stability of the financial system. The U.S. debt has reached a level where it will begin to snowball without legislative changes to both taxation and spending. Rather than attempting to pivot us to a sounder fiscal footing, the current budget reconciliation bill in the House is pushing for additional tax cuts without commensurate cuts to spending, which would only worsen the U.S. debt trajectory. In addition, the administration intends to cut the Internal Revenue Service’s workforce in half, further crippling its ability to enforce tax collection, which will lead to hundreds of billions in foregone tax revenues, primarily from wealthy tax evaders, and a further erosion of confidence in the value of U.S. debt. While we can find some solace in being the supplier of the world’s primary safe asset and medium of exchange, it is naive to assume that we are immune to a sell-off in the treasury market akin to that which occurred in 2022 for the United Kingdom, when it attempted to pursue a fiscally reckless path.
What about inflation? Tariffs will raise prices by directly raising the cost of production and consumption. Deportations will raise prices by creating labor and production shortages, also raising the cost of production. Inflation will thus rise at the same time as the economy would be contracting.
With the most recent February core CPI reading coming in at 3.1 percent, inflation continues to remain elevated following its surge during the COVID-19 pandemic. These inflationary policies will extend the substantial amount of time that the inflation has already spent above its two percent target, implementing the second wave of supply shocks in what mirrors the sequence of supply shocks that led to The Great Inflation of the 1970s. To avoid a repeat of that era, the Federal Reserve would need to aggressively pursue its commitment to the inflation target and may indeed need to raise rates, reinforcing the strength of the economic downturn. Restrictive monetary policy often summons the disapproval of the contemporaneous administration, which is one underlying reason for central bank independence. However, this administration has expressed its desire to reign in the independence of the Federal Reserve. If they attempt and succeed in influencing monetary policy decisions, it will likely lead to interest rates that are too loose to quell inflation, yet too tight to counter the downturn, leading to a longer period of low growth and high inflation, i.e. a stagflation.
Some Administrations inherit the conditions of a looming recession. What’s unique about this Recession Watch is that, to a large degree, it primarily depends on incoming policy. A recession is thus entirely avoidable. If the policies outlined above are pared back or phased in more gradually, they are unlikely to trigger one. This Watch also serves as a warning to the current administration: be careful what you wish for because, if all your wishes come true, you could very well be the author of a deep recession. And it may not simply be a standard recession that is being chaperoned into existence, but a stagflation.
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Source: https://www.anderson.ucla.edu/about/centers/ucla-anderson-forecast/recession-watch-2025.